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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal presents an issue pertaining to the right of 
set-off by a pre-bankruptcy creditor after a plan of 
reorganization has been approved by the bankruptcy court. 
Continental Airlines and its affiliates (Continental or 
Debtors) filed petitions for reorganization under Chapter 11 
of the Bankruptcy Code. In April, 1990, the Bankruptcy 
Court confirmed the Debtors' Joint Plan of Reorganization. 
In addition to ten federal government agencies that had 
timely filed proofs of claim, the General Services 
Administration of the United States (GSA or Government) 
filed an amended proof of claim on May 25, 1993, after the 
confirmation of the plan, and specifically asserted a right of 
set-off for the first time. The Bankruptcy Court held that 
the Government could not exercise set-off rights with 
respect to $4.8 million due the Debtor and ordered it to pay 
the sum to the Debtors. The Government appealed to the 
United States District Court for the District of Delaware 
which affirmed. The Government then timely appealed to 
this court.1 We also affirm. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 157(b). The district court had jurisdiction to review the 
bankruptcy court's decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 158(a). This Court 
has appellate jurisdiction of the district court's order pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. 
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I. 
 
On December 3, 1990, Continental filed for Chapter 11 
reorganization in the United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of Delaware. Subsequently, each of ten agencies 
of the United States Government filed separate proofs of 
claim with the bankruptcy court for monies owed to them 
by Continental, which in aggregate totaled approximately 
$14.5 million. Continental submitted its revisedfinal 
reorganization plan to the bankruptcy court on January 13, 
1993. Although the court resolved several objections by the 
various agencies to Continental's proposed plan, no 
government agency sought to amend its proofs of claim to 
assert any additional claims, including a right to set-off the 
$4.8 million owed by GSA. Accordingly, the bankruptcy 
court entered its order confirming the plan on April 16, 
1993 without any objection from the Government. 
 
Under the confirmed plan, the federal agencies were 
treated as general unsecured creditors, and were entitled to 
recover approximately 4.8% of their total claims. The 
Government did not appeal the confirmation order. 
Meanwhile, in August 1992, in a suit unrelated to 
Continental's bankruptcy petition, the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia ordered GSA to 
return money it had wrongfully withheld from several 
airlines, including approximately $4.8 million withheld from 
Continental.2 The Government sought a stay of the district 
court's order in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit. On April 12, 1993, the Federal Circuit 
issued an order denying the Government's request for a 
stay, but instead permitted it to deposit the disputed sum 
into the registry of the bankruptcy court while the 
Government attempted to set-off the $4.8 million it owed 
against the $14.5 million in claims due its agencies. 
 
Subsequently, on May 28, 1993, the GSA filed a motion 
with the bankruptcy court seeking to set-off its claim 
against the funds deposited in the bankruptcy court's 
registry. On September 30, 1993, the bankruptcy court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Austin, 801 F. Supp. 760 (D. D.C. 1992). The 
facts of Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Austin are not relevant to the issues 
raised on this appeal. 
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denied the Government's motion, ruling that the 
Government could not exercise its set-off rights with 
respect to the $4.8 million and ordered it to pay the money 
to the Debtor. After the Government appealed, the District 
Court for the District of Delaware affirmed the bankruptcy 
court's ruling. 
 
II. 
 
This Court's review of a district court's disposition of a 
bankruptcy appeal is plenary. The Court of Appeals 
exercises "the same review of the district court's decision as 
that exercised by the district court. The bankruptcy court's 
findings of fact are reviewable only for clear error. Legal 
determinations are subject to plenary review." In re 
Continental Airlines, 125 F.3d 120, 128 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(internal citations omitted); accord In re Engel, 124 F.3d 
567, 571 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
The Government argues that the $4.8 million it deposited 
into the registry of the bankruptcy court and which the 
Government alleged it was entitled to set-off3 against the 
$14.5 million owed by Continental were not "property of 
the [bankruptcy] estate." The Government contends that 
the bankruptcy court's confirmation of Continental's 
reorganization plan did not extinguish its right of set-off 
vis-a-vis the $4.8 million held in the court's registry.4 The 
Government principally bases its argument on Citizens 
Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 116 S. Ct. 286 (1995), which 
it argues overrules this Court's holding in United States v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. 11 U.S.C. S 553 which governs set-offs does not define the term. The 
right of set-off, as generally understood, simply means that "the debts of 
two persons who are mutually indebted may be set off against each 
other." Brian A. Blum, Bankruptcy and Debtor/Creditor S 22.2, at 348 
(1993). "Its central premise is an ancient one well-grounded in practical 
logic: If A is indebted to B, and B is likewise indebted to A, it makes 
sense simply to apply one debt in satisfaction of the other rather than 
require A and B to satisfy their mutual liabilities separately." 5 Collier 
on 
Bankruptcy P 553.01 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th rev. ed. 1997). 
 
4. For purposes of this discussion it is unnecessary to determine 
whether the Government did have a valid right of set-off; thus, the right 
will be assumed. 
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Norton, 717 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1983), heavily relied on by 
the bankruptcy court and the district court. 
 
Norton held that a creditor's withholding of funds subject 
to a set-off violated the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay 
provision,5 and also adopted the viewpoint that set-off is 
not permitted after confirmation of a bankruptcy plan of 
reorganization. In Norton, under facts similar to those 
presented on this appeal, this court held that the 
Government could not offset an outstanding tax refund 
against an outstanding tax liability after confirmation of the 
debtor's plan. In their plan, as here, the debtors made no 
provision for set-off. Emphasizing that the Government 
never objected to the plan, we concluded that it would be 
unreasonable for the Government to retain the tax refund 
as security for the debtors' obligation. Instead, we require 
the Government to pay over the refund and accept 
treatment under the plan as an unsecured creditor. 
 
The Government primarily contends that this case is 
closely analogous to and governed by the recent decision of 
the United States Supreme Court in Strumpf and thus is 
not controlled by Norton. In Strumpf, the Supreme Court 
merely held that a bank's pre-confirmation temporary 
withholding of a debt that it owed a depositor who was in 
bankruptcy, in order to protect its set-off rights, did not 
violate the automatic stay. The Court explained that the 
bank's "temporary refusal to pay was neither a taking of 
possession of [the depositor/debtor's] property nor an 
exercising of control over it, but merely a refusal to perform 
its promise." Id. at 290. Norton, therefore, is only 
overturned to the extent that it held that "state law . . . 
determine[s] when a set-off has occurred." 717 F.2d at 772 
(emphasis added). Today, under Strumpf,"the question 
whether a set-off . . . has occurred is [now] a matter of 
federal law;" a bank's temporary withholding of funds on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. S 362(a), is "an injunction that arises 
by 
operation of law immediately upon the commencement of the bankruptcy 
case. . . . Its effect is to impose a wide-ranging prohibition on all 
activity 
outside the bankruptcy forum to collect pre-petition debts from the 
debtor or to assert or enforce claims against the debtor's pre-petition 
property or estate property." Blum, Bankruptcy and Debtor/Creditor 
S 16.1, at 231. 
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deposit subject to a set-off does not violate the automatic 
stay. 116 S. Ct. at 289 (emphasis added). The 
Government's position, in this case, mischaracterizes and 
overemphasizes both the relevance and importance of 
Strumpf. It reaches this conclusion by incorrectly arguing 
that pursuant to Strumpf, because the $4.8 million was still 
held in the registry of the court at the time Continental's 
reorganization plan was confirmed, "the funds plainly were 
not `property of the estate' at that time." Thus, the 
Government's argument continues, when the court 
confirmed the plan, the funds did not vest "free and clear" 
in Continental as property of the bankruptcy estate. 
Building on this premise, the Government concludes that 
the April 16, 1993 confirmation of Continental's plan did 
not extinguish GSA's right to set-off the $4.8 million owed 
to Continental against its $14.5 million in claims due its 
agencies. 
 
As Continental points out, however, the Supreme Court 
in Strumpf expressly refused to address the issue of the 
effect of confirmation on set-offs, which is dispositive to the 
resolution of this appeal. In a footnote in Strumpf, the 
Supreme Court unequivocally "decline[d] to address [the] 
contention . . . that the confirmation of [a bankruptcy 
reorganization plan] preclude[s] [the] exercise of [a] set-off 
right." 116 S. Ct. at 290 n.**. This case, therefore, is not 
controlled by Strumpf because the Government here filed its 
motion to exercise its alleged set-off in the bankruptcy 
court almost six weeks after confirmation of Continental's 
reorganization plan (and over nine months after the district 
court held the Government liable to Continental for the 
$4.8 million in the Alaska Airlines case). 
 
Finally, the Government's contention that the Norton 
court "incorrectly considered the funds held by the creditor 
to be property of the estate" which led to its"erroneous 
ruling that confirmation of the plan extinguishes a 
creditor's set-off rights" is without merit. (citing 11 U.S.C. 
SS 1141(b), 1327 and Norton, 717 at 774). The 
Government's argument makes two critical mistakes and 
thus misses the cumulative effect of the Norton  and Strumpf 
holdings. First, although Norton implicitly held that the 
funds withheld by the creditor subject to set-off were 
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"property of the estate," today under Strumpf, the relevant 
"property of the estate" is instead the bankrupt debtor's 
claim to the funds as opposed to the possession of the 
physical funds themselves. 
 
Second, the relevant funds at issue in this case are 
clearly distinguishable from those in both Norton and 
Strumpf. In both of those cases, the creditor retained 
possession of the funds; here the Government deposited the 
$4.8 million into the registry of the court pending an 
appeal. As this Court has noted, such deposits are 
comparable to the res of a trust. The "court acts as trustee 
and is charged with the duty of determining the 
beneficiaries pursuant to the appeal. . . . [T]he 
[Government] has no beneficial interest (in the deposit[ ]) 
[while the court] holds the money as . . . trustee for the 
rightful owners when and if they are determined by the 
court." Mid-Jersey Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity-Mortgage Investors, 
518 F.2d 640, 643-44 (3d Cir. 1975). Thus, contrary to the 
Government's assertion, its set-off rights in the funds did 
not remain unaffected by confirmation of the plan because 
the Government no longer retained an interest in them; 
under Norton, its set-off right was extinguished by the 
confirmation of the plan. Although the actual funds 
themselves may not have passed as property of the estate, 
upon confirmation of the plan, Continental did acquire a 
claim or interest in them subject only to final resolution of 
the Government's appeal. Norton continues to have vitality 
and survives Strumpf. 
 
The Government argues before us, however, that to the 
extent that Norton may control and hold that the 
confirmation of the plan extinguishes all set-off rights not 
provided for in the plan, it was wrongly decided. The 
Government asserts that the Bankruptcy Code's set-off 
provision in S 553 states in the clearest of terms that the 
rest of the Bankruptcy Code "does not affect" a creditor's 
right to set-off provided that the obligations between 
creditor and debtor are mutual and that both obligations 
arose prior to the commencement of the reorganization 
proceedings. Relying on 11 U.S.C. S 553(a), the 
Government, in effect, maintains that a pre-petition 
creditor's right to set-off may be exercised without regard to 
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the status of the bankruptcy proceedings and the 
confirmation of the debtor's reorganization plan. The 
Government argues that In re De Laurentiis Entertainment 
Group, Inc., 963 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1992), supports its 
position. In De Laurentiis, the court considered the tension 
between 11 U.S.C. S 553 and 11 U.S.C. S 1141 of the 
Bankruptcy Code. Section 1141 provides for the discharge 
of pre-petition debts after completion of a bankruptcy 
proceeding.6 It also provides that any assets retained under 
the administration of reorganization are free and clear of 
any pre-petition debts. 11 U.S.C. S 5537 protects the right 
of a creditor to offset a mutual debt. After analyzing the 
statutory sections and the applicable cases in other 
jurisdictions, the De Laurentiis court concluded that S 553 
must take precedence over S 1141. Although uncertain, it 
also believed that the language of S 553 "seems intended to 
control notwithstanding any other provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code." 963 F.2d at 1276-77. The court, 
however, predicated its decision upon the particular facts in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. 11 U.S.C. S 1141 provides in pertinent part: 
 
       (a) Except as provided in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) of this 
section, 
       the provisions of a confirmed plan bind . . . any creditor . . . 
whether 
       or not such creditor . . . has accepted the plan. 
 
       . . . 
 
       (c) Except as provided in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) of this 
section 
       and except as otherwise provided in the plan or in the order 
       confirming the plan, after confirmation of a plan, the property 
dealt 
       with by the plan is free and clear of all claims and interests of 
       creditors. . . . 
       (d)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, in the 
plan, 
       or in the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan -- 
 
       (A) discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date 
       of such confirmation . . . . (emphasis added). 
 
7. 11 U.S.C. S 553 provides in pertinent part: 
 
       (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section and in sections 
362 
       and 363 of this title, this title does not affect any right of a 
creditor 
       to offset a mutual debt owing by such creditor to the debtor that 
       arose before the commencement of the case under this title against 
       a claim of such creditor against the debtor that arose before the 
       commencement of the case . . . . (emphasis added). 
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the case before it, including the creditor's diligent pursuit of 
its set-off claim before the bankruptcy court "during the 
entire period the reorganization plan was being considered." 
Id. at 1277. The court noted that the creditor, NBC, had 
filed a proof of claim and petition for relief from stay. 
 
We believe that the material facts in De Laurentiis 
distinguish it from the case before us. We recognize that a 
right of set-off is preserved under S 553 in a bankruptcy 
proceeding but we believe that the right must be exercised 
by the creditor in timely fashion and appropriately asserted 
in accordance with other provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code. Unlike the Government in this case, NBC, the 
creditor in De Laurentiis, timely filed its proof of claim in 
the bankruptcy court and claimed its right of set-off against 
its debt to the Debtor. NBC also filed a motion for relief 
from the automatic stay prior to confirmation of the plan. 
The Government did neither of these in this case. In the 
instant case, the plan of reorganization proceeded on the 
justifiable assumption that the reorganized debtor faced no 
set-off claim. On the other hand, in De Laurentiis, the 
bankruptcy court converted NBC's set-off claim into an 
adversary proceeding and NBC "pursued its claim diligently 
before the bankruptcy court at all times." Id. at 1271. There 
was no adversary proceeding here prior to plan 
confirmation, and the facts in both cases are materially 
different. 
 
The Government also cites to In re Davidovich, 901 F.2d 
1533 (10th Cir. 1990) and two bankruptcy court cases. 
Davidovich involved an arbitration debt to the debtor from 
his former law partner, and the debtor, under the facts of 
the case, had notice of the set-off claim. The court, 
however, only discussed the right of set-off under S 553 but 
made no analysis of the provisions of S 1141 of the 
Bankruptcy Code. As to the bankruptcy court cases, In Re 
Weigand, 199 B.R. 639, (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1996) relies 
largely on De Laurentiis only, and the facts of In re 
Womack, 188 B.R. 259 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1995) are 
distinguishable. Womack, unlike this case, involved a 
secured debt of the Government, income tax liability, 
payment of which was provided by the confirmed plan. The 
debtors had a refund due from the Government for an 
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overpayment on a subsequent tax year. After the 
confirmation of the plan, the Government sought to set-off 
the refund against the debt due it under the plan and the 
bankruptcy court permitted it. The bankruptcy court 
concluded that the set-off might in fact be of benefit to the 
debtors and to some of the creditors because the reduction 
of the claim of the United States under the plan will permit 
acceleration of payment to other creditors. Id. at 262. 
Because the plan provided for the ultimate payment of the 
debt due the Government, allowing the set-off merely 
accelerated its payment, and there was no need to discuss 
the conflict between S 553 and S 1141 of the Bankruptcy 
Code. 
 
Thus, we are not persuaded by the cases relied on by the 
Government that S 1141 may be disregarded when a set-off 
is asserted. Norton did not extinguish non-secured set-off 
claims, nor do we, provided they are timely asserted. In the 
instant case, the Government would have the court treat a 
non-secured claim as a secured claim to the disadvantage 
of all other general creditors. The Government here has no 
statutory secured claims as it did in Womack for income tax 
liability. Furthermore, allowing the Government under the 
facts of this case to come forward after the plan of 
reorganization has been confirmed and sua sponte decide 
that it has a valid set-off without timely filing a proof of 
claim and asserting the set-off in the reorganization 
proceedings, has a probability of disrupting the plan of 
reorganization. It may also unnecessarily protract the 
bankruptcy proceedings and consume judicial resources. 
Furthermore, it is unfair to other creditors and the debtor, 
and can conceivably undermine the plan of reorganization 
and the objectives and structure of the Bankruptcy Code. 
 
Thus, because the Government attempted to exercise its 
set-off right after confirmation of the plan, the 
Government's remaining arguments are unpersuasive. 
Norton still controls in this Circuit and precludes the 
Government's exercise of any set-off right it may have had 
once Continental's plan was approved. As the Government 
correctly notes, "a panel of this court is bound to follow the 
holdings of published opinions of prior panels of this court 
unless overruled by the court en banc or the holding is 
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undermined by a subsequent Supreme Court case." 
Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 953 F.2d 44, 46 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
 
III. 
 
To summarize, we reaffirm the ruling in Norton and hold 
that the right of a creditor to set-off in a bankruptcy 
reorganization proceeding must be duly exercised in the 
bankruptcy court before the plan of reorganization is 
confirmed; the failure to do so extinguishes the claim. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court upholding 
the bankruptcy court's ruling that the Government's set-off 
rights, if any, were extinguished upon confirmation of 
Continental's Plan of Reorganization will be affirmed. Costs 
taxed against the appellant. 
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